Defeasibility of Moral and Legal Norms
Izvleček
Članek vsebuje razpravo o pojmu uklonljivosti in uklonljivih
normah. Prične s pregledom različnih pojmovanj in razumevanj
uklonljivosti moralnih norm in v nadaljevanju predstavi štiri takšne
modele moralnih norm, in sicer nedavno predstavljene
modele a) »to je to« moralnih načel, b) privzetih moralnih načel,
c) zamejenih moralnih načel in d) uklonljivih moralnih načel ali
mehkih zakonov. Razprava se nato preseli na področje pravnih
norm ter zasleduje podobnosti in razlike med obema področjema
glede razumevanja uklonljivosti. Predstavljenih je več različnih
razumevanj in interpretacij uklonljivosti v pravnem sklepanju
s posebnim poudarkom na tistih, ki skušajo predlagati širše razumevanje
pravne uklonljivosti, in sicer tako, da ta zajema celotno
področje normativnosti. Na koncu članka je izpostavljenih nekaj
splošnih značilnosti modelov uklonljivih norm za z normativnostjo
prežeta področja in osrednjih potez značilnosti uklonljivosti,
ki jih ti delijo.
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