Defeasibility of Moral and Legal Norms

  • Vojko Strahovnik

Izvleček

Članek vsebuje razpravo o pojmu uklonljivosti in uklonljivih

normah. Prične s pregledom različnih pojmovanj in razumevanj

uklonljivosti moralnih norm in v nadaljevanju predstavi štiri takšne

modele moralnih norm, in sicer nedavno predstavljene

modele a) »to je to« moralnih načel, b) privzetih moralnih načel,

c) zamejenih moralnih načel in d) uklonljivih moralnih načel ali

mehkih zakonov. Razprava se nato preseli na področje pravnih

norm ter zasleduje podobnosti in razlike med obema področjema

glede razumevanja uklonljivosti. Predstavljenih je več različnih

razumevanj in interpretacij uklonljivosti v pravnem sklepanju

s posebnim poudarkom na tistih, ki skušajo predlagati širše razumevanje

pravne uklonljivosti, in sicer tako, da ta zajema celotno

področje normativnosti. Na koncu članka je izpostavljenih nekaj

splošnih značilnosti modelov uklonljivih norm za z normativnostjo

prežeta področja in osrednjih potez značilnosti uklonljivosti,

ki jih ti delijo.

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2018-12-23