Three theories of judicial balancing: A comparison

  • Alessio Sardo

Izvleček

This paper attempts to analyse three of the most prominent

theories of judicial balancing, considering both their presuppositions

on the nature of value judgements and their relations with

the problem of rationality: a) the first is the theory developed by

Riccardo Guastini: it is realist and emotivist; b) the second is the

logicist and objectivist theory proposed by José Juan Moreso; and

c) the third is Robert Alexy’s well-known theory of balancing, which

is procedural in a strict sense and can be considered a half-way

point between particularism and universalism. Of these three

theories, only the first one provides a real descriptive model.

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2018-12-23