Raz on Reasons, Principles and Guiding

  • Vojko Strahovnik

Izvleček

In his work on the theory of value and action, Joseph Raz de- fends some genuinely original and interesting ideas on the nature of normativity, reason and value. He defends the idea that rea- son has a guiding function in our lives. In this vein, he also puts forward a critique of moral particularism as a view that radically challenges the role of moral principles and rules in our moral de- liberation and action. He presents a complex argument and accu- ses particularism of driving a wedge betweenthe evaluative and guidingfunctionsofreasons.InthisarticleIanalysehisargument and give some suggestions on how particularism can defend itself againstit.InthelastpartofthearticleIpresentsomeofRaz’stho- ughtsonthefunctionandvalueofrulesandapplythemtomorali- tyand to the debate about the role of moral principles andrules.

References

Dancy Jonathan, Moral Reasons, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1993.
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Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 130-56.
Dancy Jonathan, Ethics without Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004.
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Objavljeno
2018-12-19